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 Abstract 
In Nigeria, there is little dispute about the power and role of the 
media as agenda-setting agency. What is subject of disput is whose 
interest the agenda ultimately serves - the elite or the masses? Despite 
the avalanche of evidence that Nigeria’s electoral processes had not 
met the least benchmark of credibility since the country returned to 
civil rule in 1999, political analyses and advertising in the media 
tended to gloss over previous electoral flaws in their quest to ascribe 
invincibility to political elites. The effect of this is that the political 
elite are emboldened in their brazen manipulation of the electoral 
processes, which is a terrorism of sorts. While there is claim of 
balance between the media’s commercialistic interests and public 
good, evidence suggests that Nigeria’s political elite have used the 
instrumentality of the media to rewrite and embellish their political 
fortunes. This paper examines the mechanisms of political terrorism 
within the context of elite-media convergence and argues that the 
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consolidation of democratic governance in Nigeria entails the 
dismantling of all the operational pitfalls that fuel and sustain 
political terrorism in all its ramifications. 
Introduction 
The role of the media in Nigeria‘s socio-economic, cultural and 
political development is not in doubt: the Nigerian media have, at 
every point in the country‘s chequered political history, stood to be 
counted. But in being counted, it has not lived above the 
contradictions of the Nigerian state. Undoubtedly, the Nigerian media 
have demonstrated robustness in its self-imposed role of setting and 
pursuing agenda both in military and democratic regimes. But, the 
domineering narrow interest of the elite has tended to eclipse its 
general utilitarian value. 
The Nigerian media created an aura of invincibility around 
personalities that anecdotal evidence upbraided for less noble roles in 
Nigeria‘s socio-economic and political development, thus 
undermining its social responsibility to the society. The cardinal social 
responsibility of the media, which ought to be owed the society in 
general was transferred to the elite on account of such factors as media 
ownership structure, commercialistic interest, dominant interest of the 
elite and overriding power of the state. The resultant effect is the 
enthronement of the culture of impunity and total disregard of the rule 
of law in government and governance. The necessary fallout of the 
media - elite complicity is the effective marginalisation of the masses. 
The media-elite linkage has created a terrorism of sorts as the society 
is detrimentally manipulated through political advertising. 
Terrorism does not merely connote the use of physical violence to 
wreak havoc on targets. Also, it does not simply entail as classically 
held by extant theorisation, the use or threat of the use of violence to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, including international organisations, for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause (Hoffman 2009). 
Terrorism has assumed wider connotations. It is not just ―disgruntled‖ 
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groups that use the instrument of terror. The state also uses terror in 
myriad ways outside the precinct of actual physical violence. We have 
used the concept of micro-terrorism to depict the genre of terrorism 
that the state visits on its citizenry. The media had collaborated with 
the elite in unleashing terror on the masses through psychological, 
political and administrative manipulation of political advertising.    
This paper examines how the Nigerian political elite have 
marginalised the masses through the instrumentality of political 
advertising with the media as a willing accomplice. It contends that 
the political terrorism of the masses through the leverage of the elite 
in the conduct of politics in Nigeria has had the effect of eroding 
democratic consolidation and therefore urgently requires redress.    
The Nigerian media: a marriage of social action and elite interest 
The history of the media in Nigeria denotes that it was conceived as a 
tool for social action. The colonial era press was a hybrid tool of 
social crusade, radical nationalism, commercial enterprise and the 
voice of the masses. The major strategies which the press adopted in 
the pursuit of its set objectives were editorial and column writing. 
Both of these strategies were used to anchor its agenda-setting role. 
As Obafemi (2008) observes, ―one of the most significant functions of 
the press lies in the power of its editorial comments in influencing 
socio-political development since the colonial days‖. 
Contemporaneously, the media introduced feature writing and 
―special project adverts‖ to deepen its agenda-setting role. 
Several factors which were rooted in the core interests of the Nigerian 
elite tended to determine the trajectory of the editorial slant of the 
various press establishments. Whether in the colonial or post colonial 
era, the media are owned by the elite and deployed principally to 
advance their interest within the society. Apart from the profit motive 
which motorises investments into the ownership of media houses, a 
major critical motive for media ownership is its use as a negotiating 
chip in inter-elite power game. The masses, whether in democratic or 
autocratic regimes, are critically important as they form the pool of 
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the human machinery necessary for the maintenance or overthrow of 
the status-quo. This is exemplified by the lack of unanimity in the 
editorial policies of the media organisations as their disposition 
oscillated between radicalism and conservatism. But the seeming 
ideological leaning of the various media organisations is underpinned 
by their overall socio-economic and political interest. 
The constant mutation of the elite class within the Nigerian federation 
and their increasing acquisition of stakes in media organisations as 
well as the contraction in opportunities during military regimes 
created the condition for the clamour for civil rule. During the military 
era, the appurtenances of power and influence were in the firm control 
of the military oligarchs and their select allies in other spheres of the 
elite class. The non-military elite occupied the fringes of the power 
circle. And even at that, the military tended to neglect established elite 
and, for its purpose, created a new set of nouveaux riches whose 
interest were made to coincide with theirs The frequent change of 
government meant that each regime raised its own set of elite who 
were to become the vanguard of its interest both in and out of 
government. The alienation of the mainstream elite and their 
subsequent estrangement from government patronage system 
motorised the agitation for democratic rule. Often, such agitation for 
political reordering found collaborators and allies in business, 
traditional, bureaucratic and retired military elite groups who felt 
marginalised in the scheme of dispensing state patronage. 
Because governance in Nigeria as elsewhere in Africa, is perceived, 
not in terms of service to the people, but as a divinely- ordained 
opportunity to partake in the sharing of the national cake, there is a 
perennial centrifugal struggle for power in the polity (Ake 1981:126). 
The elite in government and those outside of it are locked in a war of 
survival and ascendancy, with the media as a veritable platform for its 
prosecution. This was best exemplified during the regimes of retired 
General Ibrahim Babangida and the late General Sani Abacha. During 
the Babangida era, his transition programme was appropriately 
described as unending as he constantly shifted the date for the 
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termination of military rule. For Abacha, he was set to transmute to a 
democratic head of state before death stopped him. Interestingly, he 
was supported by a cross-section of the elite. 
Political transitions in Nigeria were a product of elite agitation. They 
merely recruited the masses and the media for political effect and to 
provide the necessary bite to the struggle. The media used the twin 
tool of editorial and column writing to set the agenda of ―political 
revolutions‖. Obafemi (2008) avers that the established editorial 
culture which was consolidated by the Daily Times of Nigeria 
(founded in 1926) through the innovative formation of editorial 
boards, bestowed on the press two interrelated leverages: to comment 
incisively on issues and take position and to enlighten the masses on 
the nitty-gritty of issues at stake. The overall aim was to influence 
decision-making at the highest levels as well as conscientize and 
mould public opinion at the lowest levels of followership. This 
unparalleled power wielded by the media was at the root of the anti-
media policies that manifested in the sealing of media houses as well 
as the assassination of journalists both in military and democratic 
regimes. 
The Nigerian elite, media and political transitions  
Nigeria‘s political experience is undoubtedly chequered. Before the 
1999 re-emergence of civil rule in Nigeria‘s political horizon, the 
media was under siege. The jackboot of military autocracy made sure 
it was in strict control of the media through a combination of stick and 
carrot. It was easy for the military to terrorise and control the media 
because of several factors namely; i) power of arbitrary and 
retroactive legislation; ii) government monopoly of the media; iii) 
restrictions arising from official and unofficial regulatory bodies; iv) 
state-sponsored violence against media practitioners; v) economic 
strangulation of media houses through arbitrary closure; and vi) 
systematic denial and withdrawal of patronage through advert and 
sundry placements owing to government dominance of economic 
activities. 
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Prior to 1999, Nigeria had witnessed eleven regimes, out of which the 
military accounted for eight and instituted one contraption called the 
interim national government (ING) that was eventually sacked 
through a military coup d‘état and cumulatively ruled for twenty nine 
years. Although the various military regimes used the instrumentality 
of draconian decrees to beat the media into line, they brought about 
changes that introduced robustness in the operations of the media 
especially in its agenda-setting role. Even though Obafemi (2008) 
described the relationship between the government and the media 
during the period of military autocratic regimes as ―uneasy bed-
fellows‖, it was during the military that a certain kind of liberalisation 
was introduced in the electronic department of the media. This 
liberalisation ushered in privately-owned electronic media houses. But 
the press, since the colonial era, never lost its verve as a crusader for 
common good. But the common good championed by the press did 
not have cross-class definition or distinguishing parameters. In 
actuality, ―common good‖ coincided with the dominant interest of the 
elite. The composition of the elite in Nigeria is quite fluid and 
complex, as it is not mutually exclusive but cross-cuts through 
political, bureaucratic, religious, military and traditional spheres 
(Olujide et al 2010:52). 
Since Nigeria‘s independence in 1960, there have been four 
identifiable political transitions: Three were supervised by the military 
(1979, 1992/1993 and 1999) and one by a democratic regime (2007). 
None of these transitions consciously factored the masses in its 
conceptualisation and execution. The elite on both sides of the divide 
claimed to be the mouthpiece of the people. In other words, the 
preferences of the dominant elite, who wanted power for its sake, 
were equated with those of the masses. This debatable equation of 
elite interest with that of the masses, in terms of preferable political 
system, is an offshoot of the thinking that political system determined 
economic outcomes. Or put more succinctly, that democratic regimes 
were superior to military regimes especially in terms of equitable 
distribution of socio-economic or political dividends. Even the 
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military oligarchs tended to subscribe to this logic as they promptly 
promised, on assumption of office, of fashioning a new political order. 
Babawale (2007:83) has described this as a response to the crisis of 
legitimacy that confronts military regimes. As he puts it, ―all previous 
military administrations tried to wriggle out of the crisis of legitimacy 
by making promises of a rapid return to civil rule‖. Each of the 
transition programmes had its peculiar challenges. And these 
challenges which emanated from, and engendered by, the mainstream 
and fringe political elite consisted mainly in the deployment of anti-
democratic strategies. A checklist includes: banning certain categories 
of persons from contesting, clamouring for the incumbent to 
transmute themselves into democratic leaders and the organisations of 
solidarity rallies through pressure groups for the advancement of their 
narrow interests and perennial shifting of handover date.  
There is no doubt that the various political transition programmes 
embarked upon by the military were done in deference to the 
pressures mounted by the elites through the media. In this respect, the 
media have creditably set tasks. But in championing and orchestrating 
political revolutions, the masses have held the short end of the stick. 
The various transition programmes operationally sidelined and 
relegated the masses to the fringes as their inputs were quite 
infinitesimal. For example, the Constitution Drafting Committee of 
1975 and the Constituent Assembly that produced the moribund 1979 
constitution, the 1988 Constitution Review Committee (CRC) that 
masterminded the still-birth 1989 constitution and the 1994/95 
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) whose deliberations were 
encased in the 1999 constitution were all conferences of the elite, as 
the majority of their membership were hand-picked and chosen by the 
military elite. The implication of this as Babawale (2007:77) observes 
was that people at the grassroots developed aversion for politics as 
they saw it as a vocation of the elite. Therefore, their involvement in 
politics was purely for the immediate benefits or inducement to be 
obtained for that effort.  
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The transition programmes, as desirable as they were to the overall 
interest of the country pitched the elite in squabbles that underscored 
their parochial interests. For instance, these squabbles enabled the 
Babangida Transition Programme to be subjected to countless 
adjustments from October  1, 1990 to 1992 and to August 27, 1993 
until it was fruitlessly terminated on June  23, 1993 (Babawale 
2007:58, 91). The same forces that egged IBB towards the 
abandonment of the democratic goals it set for its regime hijacked the 
late Gen. Abacha and put him on the path of self succession. While 
different sections of the elite were either pacified or cowed, the 
intrinsic lot of the masses was total neglect in the scheme of unfolding 
political drama as they were threatened with mass extermination. 
Dada (2006: B5) avers that the ―late Gen. Sani Abacha proclaimed 
with his mouth that he would continue to rule even if the population of 
Nigeria was reduced to six [and] that he would deal decisively with 
anyone who tried to hinder his ambition of perpetuating himself in 
power‖. The Abacha-for-President campaign under the aegis of 
Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA), the National Mobilization 
and Persuasion Committee for Abacha 1998 and other motley pro-
Abacha-for-President organisations clearly portrayed the convergence 
of elite-media conspiracy. Elite conspiracy consisted in the seeming 
unanimous adoption of the Abacha candidacy by the then five 
political parties and the deployment of the propaganda of the 
indispensability of Abacha in the crafting of a new Nigeria. A handful 
of anti-Abacha elite who could no longer take the heat of Abacha‘s 
counter-attack fled into self-exile. The media, in consideration of its 
survival and commercial interest, in the face of the rising culture of 
impunity against press freedom, not only tempered its critical 
reportage but capitulated in its hard-line stance. The conformists were 
rewarded with patronage through advert-placements and sponsorship 
of special features from the government and pro-government 
organisations. There is no doubt that the Nigerian media antagonised 
anti-democratic policies of various regimes as well as championed the 
restoration of democracy. But they did so within the ambit of the 
sphere of interest specified by their management.  
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Political Advertising as a Weapon of Political Terrorism 
Nigeria‘s experience in political engineering points to a diversified 
experience. From parliamentarianism to presidentialism with military 
autocracy in-between, political advertising has been deployed in 
numerous ways through various media and for myriad purposes.  The 
claim by Olajide, Adeyemi and Gbadeyan (2010:53) that ―the 
extensive use of television and radio has supplanted direct 
appearances on the campaign trail‖ might be true for the developed 
economies but obviously false for underdeveloped countries 
especially in Africa. Several factors account for the seeming 
indispensability of rallies in Africa as a major vote-gathering strategy. 
These include: low level of information and communication 
technology (ICT), widespread poverty, lack of necessary 
infrastructure to power television stations; low ratio of person-to-TV 
access, corruption and absence of people-oriented development 
models often associated with leadership and governance failure. The 
electorate in underdeveloped countries generally perceive election 
period as their ―once-in-a-blue-moon‖ opportunity to take their piece 
of the national cake from their leaders. 
Pinto-Duschinsky (2004:17-18), succinctly states that television does 
not yet rule the world. Indeed, in many parts of Africa and Asia, 
television sets and even radios can be quite hard to find outside the 
cities. In almost all African countries rallies are still the best way for 
candidates to reach the voters. In Nigeria, political rallies and direct 
appearances in specially arranged town meeting venues have remained 
an integral part of its electioneering campaign process. But, because 
of the increasing relevance of the media, (and in recent times the ICT 
outlets like the GSM and Internet), such direct appearances have come 
to serve the purpose of consolidating the orchestrated media 
bombardment through political adverts. Political advertising connotes 
more than mere ―use of the media by political candidates to increase 
their exposure to the public‖ as adduced by Olujide, Adeyemi and 
Gbadeyan (2010:53). Such a definition is simplistically narrow and 
does not portray its complexities. 
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As useful as extant categorisation of political advertising might be, it 
falls short of methodological exactitude in connection with Nigeria. 
While spotting the flaw in Johnston and Kaid‘s classification of 
political advertising into image and issue adverts, Olajide, Adeyemi 
and Gbadeyan (2010:53) propounded three major categories of 
political advertising as: political, contrast and negative or attack 
adverts. Interestingly, they were caught in the same methodological 
net they set out to untangle. The manner in which political advertising 
has been deployed over the years in Nigeria provides the radar 
towards its categorisation. We contend that there are five distinct 
categories of political advertising in Nigeria‘s political space namely;  
(a) Activist adverts – concerned with advocacy for groups or 
neglected interest outside the domain of the dominant elite 
interest. 
(b) Status quo adverts – aimed at maintaining the status quo in 
terms of regimes, office holders and their policies. 
(c) Continuity/Change adverts – directed at mobilising and 
winning support for either continuity for the officeholder or 
political party or for change of the status quo. 
(d) Federal Character adverts – involves the demand for 
inclusiveness in governance and concession for certain 
political positions to engender feelings of belonging, equity 
and justice in the polity. 
(e) Smear Campaign adverts:  Where certain categories of people 
are negatively labelled, preparatory to their political 
destruction. 
Political advertising has been a permanent feature in Nigeria‘s 
political firmament irrespective of the form of government in 
operation. Both military and democratic governments variously 
utilised political advertising to achieve their ends. In all these, their 
target had been the masses. In other words, political advertising has 
been deployed as a handy tool by both types of government to 
Vol. 8 (2) Serial No. 33, April, 2014 Pp. 96-117 
 
Copyright© IAARR 2014: www.afrrevjo.net 106 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
 
manipulate the masses in the furtherance of their interest. Often, it is 
the conflict of interest amongst the elite that motorises political 
advertising.  
While political advertising targets a segment or the entirety of relevant 
population of eligible voters, its aim is to successfully mobilise them 
for the purpose of marketing the object of its campaign. In other 
words, while presenting the subject of its campaign, political adverts 
ultimately expect a feedback, whether positive or negative, from the 
masses. To this end, political advertising does not function in isolation 
but within the dictates of the political environment. Thus, whether in 
one-party, two-party or multiparty; autocratic or democratic states; 
political advertising is indispensable both for mobilising support for 
regimes‘ consolidation as well as legitimacy and for the opposition 
parties‘ drive for change. Put succinctly, political advertising involves 
the evolvement of effective strategies aimed at building and packaging 
candidates and political platforms within the framework of credibility 
on the one hand or the creation of doubts towards the opponents on 
the other hand, for the sole purpose of winning the support of the 
masses in democratic or non-democratic states. The tasks of political 
advertising are not exhausted in the checklist propounded by Lund 
(cited in Awonusi 1996: 107) namely, attracting attention, arousing 
interest, stimulating desire, creating conviction and getting action in 
the form of support. The tasks of political advertising also include 
countering the strong points of the opponents; shoring up the 
weaknesses of the subject of political adverts and inundating the target 
audience‘s socio-psychological space with messages of the superiority 
of the subject over other contenders. 
The environmental and socio-economic peculiarities of states 
determine the dominant political advertising strategies in operation. 
Apart from the strategy of direct self-marketing in rallies and 
campaign trails and the use of pamphlets, circulars, fliers, billboards 
and stickers, the mass media have been the most influential political 
advertising strategy in Nigeria. 
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Undoubtedly the dominant interest of the elite determines the 
trajectory and competitive nature of political advertising. Political 
advertising in Nigeria often incorporates such primordial elements as 
ethnicity, religion and gender as its rallying strength. The Nigerian 
elite use them as mobilising totem to herd the masses towards their 
preferred political inclination. The state of development in Nigeria 
vis-à-vis the nature of political advertising shows a disjunction 
between political claim and reality. The media have used the concept 
of balancing to surreptitiously fan the embers of its interest and fixate 
it within the front burners of public consciousness. The failed tenure 
elongation project of Obasanjo provides a veritable example. A 
groundswell of political advertising towards the realisation of the 
Third Term project was orchestrated and sustained by a trans-ethnic 
and inter-elite coalition led by Mr. Festus Odimegwu, the erstwhile 
Managing Director of Nigerian Breweries Plc. Obasanjo was reified 
as a messiah and his regime ascribed with doubtful credentials of 
economic prosperity  (Olayinka 2006:B5). Although there was a 
preponderance of opinions against the project, there was nevertheless 
certain ambivalence in the media. 
Whose media? Whose interest? Nigerian elite and media 
ownership 
The motive for media ownership in Nigeria has remained unchanged. 
Media ownership is dictated by ideological and political 
considerations. From the colonial era to the present, elite interest 
dictated and powered the media. The dominant newspapers of the 
colonial era, the West African Pilot, the Nigerian Daily Telegraph and 
Lagos Daily News were founded by the late Nnamdi Azikiwe and 
Obafemi Awolowo for the twin purposes of dislodging colonialism 
and entrenching themselves as the inheritors of state power in 
postcolonial Nigeria (Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine 2003:183). The 
explosion in the number of newspapers, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, coincided with major prospects of change in power 
configuration in Nigeria. For instance, in the course of the Second 
Republic politics (1979-1893), Chief Moshood Abiola was ostensibly 
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motivated to establish the Concord Media group chiefly to further his 
political interest which consisted in challenging and displacing the 
monopolistic hold of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN) on the South-West in the interest of his party, the 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Other waves of newspaper 
establishment coincided with other epochs in Nigeria‘s political and 
economic development. 
The liberalisation of the electronic media through Decree 38 of 1992 
as amended by Act No 55 of 1999 introduced a new robustness in the 
importance of the media in the Nigerian polity. The Federal 
Government through the instrumentality of this decree set up the 
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) with the core 
responsibilities to regulate and deregulate broadcasting in Nigeria in 
terms of licensing stations, regulating broadcast content and setting 
standards for quality broadcasting. According to the NBC, the 
liberalisation of the broadcast industry led to the landmark expansion 
in private investment in the sector. So far, 55 companies have been 
licensed to offer radio broadcasting service, 25 companies licensed to 
offer television services, 34 for wireless cable (MMDS) and 5 for 
direct-to-home (DTH) satellite TV platforms. What this meant was 
that the monopoly status of government through the Nigeria 
Television Authority (NTA) and Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria (FRCN) was effectively dismantled. This shift in policy was 
what gave birth to the establishment of the pioneering Africa 
Independent Television (AIT), Minaj Broadcast International (MBI) 
and a host of other electronic media houses. Jibo (2003:582) has 
argued that a constant fixture in the firmament of media practice in 
Nigeria, as in other parts of the world, is the ever-present personal 
interest of the proprietor or the senior journalists in their overall 
operations. 
Two factors made the media an attractive means of articulating, 
aggregating and pursuing socio-economic and political agenda of the 
elite. The first is the ever-expanding interchanges within the elite class 
manifesting in complex trans-migration from one cadre to another and 
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the attendant rivalry for ascendancy. The constant interchanges and 
cross-cadre movement amongst political, bureaucratic, religious, 
military, business or corporate and traditional cadres created 
contraction in available opportunities. The media, thus, provide 
leverage for ascendancy. The second factor is the nature of party 
formation in Nigeria and the ambush strategy often employed by rival 
elite groups to take control of party leadership. The media have been 
elevated into alternate party machinery to mobilise support. Party 
formation models in Nigeria take the form of top-bottom rather than 
bottom-top direction. What this implies is that the trajectory of party 
formation has always been dictated by either the government or the 
elite and never the masses. For instance, the parties in the aborted 
Babangida Transition, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
National Republican Convention (NRC), were the creation of the 
military government. The political parties formed in the present 
democratic dispensation were the transmutation of erstwhile factions 
of the elite. For instance, while the PDP was a coalition of a group 
known as G-34 and 25 other associations, the former National 
Democratic Coalition (NADECO) metamorphosed into Alliance for 
Democracy (AD) and the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP, then 
APP) was a coalition of the remaining non-conformist elites especially 
those that received considerable patronage from the Abacha regime 
(http://www.peoplesdemocraticparty.net/index-php?option-
com_content&view=article& id=47&Itemid=28&limistart-1; Igwilo 
2011; Synge 2003:781). Other existing parties are chips off the blocks 
of these three pioneering parties in the present dispensation.                 
Because of the medley of elite cadres that united to form political 
parties and their contending interests, party politics in Nigeria is 
essentially characterised by constant alignment and realignment of 
forces that tended to be centrifugal. The media, thus, serve as their 
joker to constantly manoeuvre their way into positions of influence 
and affluence. In all of these calculations, the masses were reduced to 
mere pawns in the chessboard of elite interests. Even the elite 
journalists have often converted their positions as a means to access 
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juicy appointments. Despite the elaborate code of ethics for the 
Nigerian media especially the supremacy of public interest, elite 
interest, often garbed as public interest, is still supreme and dictates 
the trend of media operations.  Where a media organisation is not 
directly linked to the elite, it is converted to acting as their foot 
soldiers. Under such scenario, personal aggrandisement and patronage 
become codes of ethical operation. As Fakoya (2010) puts it, 
Nigerian journalists are merely a reflection of the 
Nigerian sickness… They will write anything as long 
as money can exchange hands. The public have been 
fed with half truths and distorted concoctions…. 
The dimensions and politics of terrorism: the media-elite linkage                                                  
Despite the lack of agreement amongst scholars as to the defining 
characteristics of terrorism, in general terms, it denotes the 
deployment of violent and non-violent means towards a target in order 
to achieve a desired end or to precipitate the achievement or non-
achievement of a desired end. A representative national 
conceptualisation of terrorism yields certain uniformity. Hoffman 
(2009) affirms that the legal system and code of law of the United 
Kingdom influenced those of the United States, Canada, and Israel as 
to the boundaries and connotations of terrorism. Thus, 
the United Kingdom‘s Terrorist Act 2000; United States Code, Title 
18, Section 2331 (18 USC 2331); Canada‘s Anti-terrorism Act (Bill 
C-36) and the Israeli Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33 all 
perceive terrorism as the use or threat of the use of violence to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, including international organisations, for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Paul Wilkinson 
has also described terrorism as a ―special weapon or method which 
has been used throughout history by both states and sub-states, [and] 
organizations for a whole variety of political causes or purposes‖ 
(cited in Abonyi 2006:26). These definitions are problematic 
considering their narrow and restrictive parameters. The goals of 
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terrorism are not always the achievement of political, religious or 
ideological goals. They transcend those goals. Terrorism is motorised 
by the quest for the ascendancy of personal or group interests in a 
milieu of interests. It is erroneous to contend as Gould (1999) did, that 
terrorism is typically a unidirectional and bottom-top phenomenon 
and a war waged by persons and groups who considered themselves as 
unprivileged victims of socio-economic, political, and technological 
advancement in the modern world and who desired visibility for the 
purpose of a redress. Within the global and national arena, the tool of 
terrorism has been wielded by individuals, groups, organisations, 
states and other non-state actors in the pursuit of their interest. 
Understandably, the different strategies adopted by terrorist groups 
target both tangible and intangible landmarks. Although every actor 
within the global arena is a potential terrorist, it is the non-state actor, 
on account of its supra-sovereign status, that poses the greatest danger 
to global stability and system survival. But, within national 
boundaries, the state has, in a number of ways, dispensed terror on the 
citizenry, notwithstanding the form of government.  
The capabilities of various actors to unleash terror and the magnitude 
of damage achievable through terrorist attacks have led to the 
differentiation of terrorism into macro and micro. The difference 
between the two lies in the sophistication of organisation, resources at 
their disposal, target of attacks, expected outcome of attacks, 
magnitude of attack, and nature of weapons used in carrying out 
attacks. While macro-terrorism necessarily entails broad-based 
violence using sophisticated weaponry, micro-terrorism covers small 
targets and uses ordinary weapons and/or psychological tools. Micro-
terrorism has been conceptualised contemporaneously in terms of 
contraction in the magnitude of the effect of terror attacks. This 
conceptualisation flowed from the shift in the strategy and target of 
terrorist attacks by groups especially the al Qaeda. Their orientation 
has shifted towards the ―strategy of thousand acts‖, that is, systematic 
piecemeal attacks on their enemies instead of a big bang. Zakaria 
(2010) describes micro-terrorism as small-scale terrorism, driven from 
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the local level, whose practitioners choose not the largest or most 
spectacular operations but those that are likely to succeed. As useful 
as this definition is, it narrowly conceptualises micro-terrorism within 
the ambit of non-state actors. State actors are also agents of micro-
terrorism and their targets are not just anarchists or anti-government 
groups but in certain cases, the generality of the masses. In this study, 
we shall expand the derivative of micro-terrorism a notch to 
incorporate government policies targeted at hoodwinking the people. 
The avenue through which the national elite orchestrate their terror on 
the people is the mass media through the psychological weapons of 
political advertising.  
Since Nigeria‘s independence and despite the visionless contraction of 
the Nigerian economy to monoculturalism, Nigeria has earned more 
than enough to catapult it out of the dinginess of Third World 
categorisation. According to Ikpeze (2004:6), between 1973 and 1981, 
Nigeria earned the fabulous sum of over US$60 billion from oil 
exports alone. From being under-borrowed in 1973, Nigerian became 
a debtor-nation from 1978 onwards as a result of two jumbo loans 
borrowed by the country. As a result, Nigeria deployed substantial 
percentage of its annual earnings to service these loans, which were 
ostensibly committed to the satiation of elite greed. Before the much 
celebrated debt reprieve by the duo of Word Bank and the IMF in 
2005, Nigeria had, as at 2003, spent a cumulative whopping sum of 
US $35 billion as debt service payments (Adetunji 2004:1). 
Notwithstanding that the two jumbo loans which culminated in 
Nigeria‘s debt peonage originated in General Obasanjo‘s tenure as 
military head of state, the debt relief was eulogised to high heavens 
and formed the fulcrum around which his unconstitutional tenure 
elongation campaign revolved. The media shirked its responsibility to 
the people, and was awash with all sorts of encomiums and pro-tenure 
elongation political adverts that were calculated to ambush the 
people‘s political choices. 
The anti-corruption crusade of the Obasanjo era which ought to have 
served the nation was converted into a personal political tool for 
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vendetta. The result of this was that as at the end of Obasanjo‘s 
presidency in 2007, only 10 high profile cases had been charged to 
court (Adisa 2011). Although Obasanjo set up the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and stepped 
up propaganda against corruption, the fight against corruption was 
selective and was used as a tool to cow ―unruly‖ elites. Despite the 
revelation by the EFCC that since 1999, political office holders had 
looted Nigeria‘s treasury to the tune of US$100bn (Daily Independent 
18/09/2006), no mainstream political office holder was in jail, except 
for the isolated cases of the former Inspector General of the Police, 
Mr. Tafa Balogun and former Chairman of Nigerian Ports Authority 
(NPA), Chief Olabode George.  Despite the publication of a list of 
political office holders under investigation by the EFCC for a myriad 
of corruption charges in the media, these politicians were not stopped 
and, with their stolen wealth, entrenched themselves further into 
government. The result is that corrupt people are recycled in power 
and corruption endemically entrenched in the polity. The media have 
functioned as image-laundering organ of the elite and successfully 
too. Kargbo (2006:132) in outlining the media-elite conspiracy 
observes: 
99 percent of the people do not have the opportunity 
of crosschecking or conducting reality checks on 
public actors. It is the press [and the electronic media] 
that present and define (sic) these characters and 
more often than not, it is the pictures of these people 
as presented by the media that the people would hold. 
The Nigerian political elite have evolved mechanisms through which 
they terrorise the people. The media often distorted the truth about 
indicted politicians describing them as ―innocent‖ victims and 
attributing their travails to politics, ethnicism or such primordial 
sentiments. Two factors power the elite-media collaboration: the 
patronage from state apparati of power and cash (Kargbo 2006:B2). 
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The seeming balance of the commercialistic interest of the media and 
their social responsibilities has led to such contraptions as a special 
projects or features. Under this guise, certain illegalities such as first 
lady syndrome and the celebration of hollow rituals such as hundred 
(100) days in office where all manner of uncensored political adverts 
chronicling dubious progress are fed to the people. Notwithstanding 
the disclaimers by the media organisations, this propaganda serves 
only the ruling elite. To compound issues, the foreign media are often 
employed for greater effects, especially to deepen the legitimacy of 
the propaganda. The CNN has often been chosen to fill this gap. Since 
Nigeria‘s return to democratic rule, it has aired several political 
adverts of state governments, often with trumped-up developmental 
projects. And the rationalisation for the waste of resources which 
these pockets of propaganda represent has been anchored on the need 
to showcase the developmental strides within the states as a strategy to 
attract foreign direct investment. The tenure elongation agenda of the 
Obasanjo regime offers a good example. Its proponents used the CNN 
to advance its cause for two reasons: one, to consolidate the domestic 
misinformation of the people and, two to orchestrate international 
misinformation.  
There is general agreement that since 1999, elections in Nigeria have 
not measured up to the international benchmark of free and fair. And 
yet, the media have in their analyses, attributed political invincibility 
to certain people from Oyo to Anambra and from Rivers to Zamfara 
states. From 1999 till 2007, there was progressive alienation of the 
people from exercising their franchise and determining who should 
govern them as the electoral process was compromised by the 
electoral umpire and manipulated by the political elite. This scenario 
threw up the godfather syndrome in Nigeria politics. As obnoxious 
and destabilizing as the godfather syndrome was in Nigerian politics 
the dramatis personae were made heroes of in the media and were 
neither prosecuted nor made to pay restitution for the political 
terrorism they unleashed on the masses. 
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Conclusion  
The starring point to redress the micro-terrorism that the political elite 
and the Nigerian state had unleashed on the masses is the review of 
the Nigerian constitution through the involvement of the people. As it 
is, it is a document of the elite.  Through uncensored political 
advertising, the media had become an accomplice in the 
marginalisation of the masses. While business principles dictate that 
the survival of business enterprises hinges on profitability, the media 
must recognise that the overriding impetus for its existence is the 
promotion of social justice. It is when social justice has been served 
that profit would come under the purview of consideration. The 
unwitting effect of the current political advertising regimen in practice 
in Nigeria is the emboldening of the culture of impunity and the 
glorification of a warped mindset that everything is answerable to 
monetary inducement; two effects that are anti-development.   
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